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Abstract 
This paper finds its origin in the emerging knowledge and information 
society accompanying the structural economie and technological changes in our 
era. Based on the recognition of the critical importance of engineering creativity 
for regional competitiveness, the role of knowledge and information in regional 
development is explored. Next, the potential offered by knowledge and informa-
tion centres in regional and urban growth processes is emphasized, with a 
particular view on the role played by the modem concept of science parks. The 
paper then identifies the critical success factors of science parks as an instrument 
of regional policy by investigating the bottlenecks in each development stage of 
the life cycle of a science park, based on a broad inquiry among various science 
parks all over the world. 

1. The Changing Scène of Regional Development 
In the past decade the scope and substance of regional development have 
drastically changed. The traditional viewpoints and policy strategies on problem 
regions - characterized by high unemployment, low income and low productivity, 
poor accessibility and insufficiënt level of public services - have shifted from 
passive support measures to active self-reliance strategies. The awareness has 
grown that regions are no islands in a calm sea, but part of a spatial economie 
network dominated by competitive forces (Nijkamp 1993). Regions which -
through their competitive advantage - are able to attract a considerable share of 
the potential regional, national and international market will become the winners 
in this game (cf. Biehl 1986; Porter 1991). Thus regions may in principle be 
regarded as islands of innovation and entrepreneurial spirit. 
This regional focus has often been advocated from the viewpoint of locatio-
nal efficiency induced by both a reduction in transaction costs as a result of 
geographical proxirnity and the presence of external economies stimulating an 
industrial atmosphere and incubation climate. But it is increasingly recognized 
(see Camagni 1991) that the regional scène is extremely dynamic, which offers 
two more potential benefits for innovative regions: 
a collective learning process that stimulates local creativity and 
technogenesis through local synergies (see also Kamann and Nijkamp 
1990). 
a decline in dynamic uncertainty intrinsic in technological developments 
and innovative processes. 
Clearly, emphasis on dynamic development processes in a competitive and 
innovative setting leads directly into an evolutionary approach to spatial 
dynamics. 
An important element of recent theory building in the field of regional 
dynamics is based on network concepts, not only in terms of material infrastruc-
ture and communication networks favouring the competitive advantages of 
regions, but also in terms of new network configurations of firms and services 
institutions aiming at achieving dynamic excellence. Networks provide proper 
channels for efficiënt logistics, marketing and sales policies, as well as for 
information gathering and processing. 
The relevance of network views on spatial competition has also been 
demonstrated by the subdivision of regions into promising regions, called 3C+ 
regions (regions characterized by connectivity, creativity, and competence), and 
lagging regions, called 3C- regions (regions characterized by congestion, claustro-
fobia and criminality) (see also Andersson 1985, and Nijkamp 1993). Thus 
networks are able to offer an incubation function for new entrepreneurial 
strategies through an efficiënt interchange of knowledge and/or information, 
goods and people. In conclüsion, access to a high quality knowledge, information, 
telecommunication and infrastructure network offers many possibilities for 
creative and new decisions and strategies of firms. This observation is once more 
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important, as the increasing share of the service sector and the knowledge 
component in industrial products suggests that learning principles (learning-by-
examining, learning-by-doing and learning-by-using) become a critical competi-
tive tooi: reduction of uncertainty is most probably the highest benefit in an 
information socieity. 
Traditionally, firms are supposed to face five types of uncertainty (Camagni 
1991): 
information gaps caused by real world complexities 
assessment gaps caused by lack of ex ante qualitative information 
competence gaps caused by insufficiënt information processing abilities 
of decision makers 
competence-decision gaps caused by imperfect foresight into future 
strategie possibilities 
control gaps caused by lack of control or power on new actions. 
In coping with such a wide range of static and dynamic uncertainties firms 
are trying to minimize risk and wrong decisions through various strategies: 
search functions 
screening functions 
transcoding functions 
selection functions 
control functions. 
In doing so, firms are intrinsically dependent on their local environment, 
which may provide the following support mechanisms for these five functions, 
respectively: 
collective information - garnering and screening functions 
signalling functions 
collective learning processes 
collective processes of developing managerial styles and decision rou-
tines 
informal decision coordination functions. 
In conclusion, information and knowledge are becoming one of the most 
critical success factors in regional development policies. This issue wiU be further 
discussed in the next section. 
2. Knowledge Infrastructure and Regional Development 
The increasing knowledge and information intensity of modem production 
has provoked an increasing orientation of regional policy towards the creation of 
R&D centres, research laboratories, science parks, universities, transfer centres 
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and related institutes for higher education (see Andersson et al. 1989). The 
regional economie interest in such knowledge-intensive institutes was not so 
much determined by the related expenditure patterns of the (relatively high 
income) employees of such institutes, but rather by the push effects of knowl-
edge intensive areas. Silicon Valley, the Research Triangle, Route 128 in Boston, 
Tsukuba, Sophia Antipolis, and the Cambridge Science Park are well known 
examples of successful initiatives (cf. Hall and Markusen 1985, Rogers and 
Larsen 1984). Consequently, the concept of a knowledge network has increasing-
ly come to the fore as an instrument in a regional development strategy (see also 
Batten et al. 1989). Such knowledge networks generate, collect and transfer 
scientific information via a multitude of channels and hence generate an 
information-rich incubator function for knowledge-based activities in both the 
private and the public sector. Especially the above mentioned 3C+ regions offer 
the necessary favourable conditions for competitive advantage. As shown by 
Batten et al. (1989) such regions are nodes in both material and non-material 
networks (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Knowledge and information in a networked society 
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Source: Batten et al. (1989) 
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The assessment of the socio-economic impacts of knowledge centres is not 
an easy task (see Charles and Howells 1992; Trow and Nybom 1991), because 
information is scarce, many spill-overs to other areas do exist and the reai effects 
have a long lead time. A very interesting example of university impact analysis in 
the Netherlands using sophisticated regional economie models can be found in 
Florax (1992). Even though the direct regional economie benefits are not 
always impressive, the generative effects of knowledge centres - in terms of 
attracting high tech activities - are in general regarded as the most important 
cornerstones of regional R&D strategies. 
It is indeed noteworthy that from the viewpoint of business life, the presence 
of a knowledge network is increasingly regarded as a primary locational factor 
(see Aydalot 1984, Malecki 1984, Nijkamp 1986, Oakey et al. 1987 and Premus 
1982), as it allows entrepreneurs to benefit from the presence of new informa-
tion availabüity, while at the same time a linkage to a knowldege and informa-
tion node provides access to broader national and international networks. 
It is therefore no surprise that many regions in the industrialized world are 
increasingly reaping the fruits of a network economy in which regions, and in 
particular metropolitan areas, play a central role in an international competitive 
system. It is evident that a prerequisite for becoming 'winner' in this competitive 
game is to build up a flexible and innovative high-technology and high-knowl-
edge economy. Recent experiences show that there are various alteraative 
development options in policies regarding knowledge creation, technological 
restructuring and innovation. They range from large-scale top down driven 
initiatives (e.g., the Airbus consortium in Europe) to small-scale local initiatives 
(e.g., regional information systems for local retailers). 
Despite the diversity in these initiatives, there is one lesson which has 
become a common belief among both private and public decision-makers: 
technological innovation (and knowledge) is not 'manna from heaven', but can 
be stimulated and induced by well focussed initiatives. The provision of incen-
tives and the creation of favourable incubation conditions can generate creative 
and innovative behaviour of entrepreneurs. One of such stimuli is offered by the 
science park concept which is the focal point of the present paper. This concept 
is based on a synergetic view on scientific research and technological progress: 
innovations can be stimulated by locating new entrepreneurial activities in 3C+ 
regions (see Section 1). Such regions are a typical product of a competitive 
network economy. The success of a 3C+ region depends in particular on: 
1) the availabüity of technological hardware, such as the existence of a good 
transport and Communications system and the availabüity of land; 
2) the existence and use of advanced sopvare, such as the availabüity of a 
skilled and dedicated labour force, a population that is receptive to technical 
progress, and access to research institutes, end users and supply markets; 
3) the implementation of appropriate orgware, e.g. the presence of supporting 
services and government policies favouring entrepreneurship; 
4) the presence of a favourable ecoware, e.g., in terms of residential and 
cultural amenities; 
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5) the availability of finware, such as the availability of seed capital and venture 
capital. 
The previous elements can be incorporated in a so-called pentagon model 
representing the decisive factors for successful 3C+ regions (see Figure 2). 
Figure 2. The pentagon model 
It is interesting to observe that the long history of Europe clearly demon-
strates that the rise and fall of 3C+ regions depend to a large extent on the 
factors mentioned in Figure 2. The places favoured in the Hanseatic period, the 
Industrial Revolution, and the current Information Age were able to generate 
new activities as a result of favourable incubator conditions embedded in the 
above five pentagon factors. 
Seen from the above angles, it is evident that knowledge and information 
nodes, which are often located in accessible industrial and commercial centres 
with a diverse labour market and a creative climate, are to be regarded as 
obvious candidates for membership of the 3C+ regions family. In this context, 
the phenomenon of a science park has to be understood which has become a 
popular policy tooi in many countries. In addition to exploiting the strong 
features of 3C+ regions via science park initiatives, in many countries science 
parks have also become a part of regional policy regarding 3C- regions. This 
difference will undoubtedly have implications for the success and performance of 
science parks, as will be shown in subsequent sections. 
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3. Pathways to Science Parks 
Technological development and economie growth are becoming increasingly 
intertwined phenomena. Technologically advanced products determine to a large 
extent the country's international competitiveness and therefore its welfare. In 
addition, it is also recognized that our world is at the brink of a technological 
revolution based on a high knowledge intensity. The impact of infonnation 
technology on other sectors of the economy is expected to lead to an upswing in 
economie activity, and ultimately to a so called 'information 800161/ or 'network 
society'. 
Public decision makers and economists have become aware of this important 
relationship and feel that technological development ought to be stimulated. 
Many (especially regional) governments have therefore extended the visible hand 
of the state by assisting "high tech" industries and individual companies by means 
of new policy instruments. Many of these instruments are aimed at the formation 
and growth of small new technology based firms, which are considered as 
seedcora of the technological revolution. 
This rising interest in technology policy has been accompanied by a general 
belief that universities and other research institutes represent a resource, in 
terms of knowledge and research, that can be tapped in order to promote high 
technology-based growth. Some authors have even compared the role of the 
research institute in an information society with that of a factory in an industrial 
society. The increased attention for technological development and the role of 
research institutes in this process has led to the rise of a new concept, viz. the 
science park. 
Science parks are property developments alongside a knowledge or research 
institute. Their aim is to encourage the growth and formation of both new 
technology based firms and research institutes or knowledge centres. To accom-
plish this aim a science park facilitates the transfer of knowledge between 
research and business life; their function is that of engineering creativity. 
Although a large number of science parks have been set up by various 
government agencies - often for reasons of regional technology development -, 
they are by no means the only founders. Universities have been among the first 
park founders and in the 1980s private companies have become actively involved 
in science park development. 
A government agency, a research institute or a private firm participates in a 
science park for the simple reason that it expects to benefit from its involvement 
(cf. Currie 1985, Dunford 1992, van Geenhuizen 1986, Gibb 1985, Klurfain-
Spyridakis 1992, and Lacave 1992). To mention a few examples: a university may 
become more involved in industrial problems and practice, a small high-tech 
firm can use a university's computing facilities, and a city council may effectively 
promote technological development. A very interesting question then is: under 
what circumstances can the benefits of a science park be maximized. In other 
words, the central issue of this paper is: what are the critical success factors of a 
science park? 
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Many regional government agencies aim to build up a flexible and innova-
tive high-technology economy by means of various customized incentives for the 
region at hand. The science park concept is one such incentive. It should be 
noted however, that nowadays various terms, such as science park, business park 
or incubator are being used to describe broadly the same phenomenon. We will 
start with some definitional and terminological remarks (see Nijkamp et al. 
1992). 
According to the widely used definition of the United Kingdom Science Park 
Association (UKSPA), a science park is: 
A property based initiative which: 
has formal operational links with a university, other higher educational 
institutions, or a major centre of research (hereafter HEIs); 
is designed to encourage the formation and growth of knowledge-based 
businesses and other organizations normally resident on site; 
has a management function which is actively engaged in the transfer of 
technology and business skills to the organizations on site. 
We use the term 'science park' for every such property based initiative, but 
it can be useful to differentiate between four different types of science and 
creativity based policy initiatives. 
(1) Incubators are 'breeding grounds' for young scientists who want to 
commercialize their own research. An incubator centre is small, provides 
financial, managerial and technical assistance to the new entrepreneurs and is 
usually created by an HEI. 
(2) Science parks are set up to promote the cooperation between HEIs and 
innovative enterprises. In order to improve the chances of a fruitful cross-
fertilization of the ideas of entrepreneurs and scientists, most science parks are 
set up in the neighbourhood of HEIs. Although a science park often has an 
incubator on its site, its efforts are aimed at attracting existing enterprises. 
(3) A technopolis encompasses the concept of a science park. Apart from 
promoting the commercialization of science, it tries to create a general 'recep-
tiveness' to a society based on technology. A true technopolis has a scientific, an 
economie as well as a social dimension. At this moment, the only cities that 
qualify as a technopolis are Tsukuba in Japan and Sophia Antipolis in France. 
All other configurations are of a much smaller scale. 
(4) A business park tries to promote the establishment of knowledge-based 
firms, but has no formal operational links with HEIs. It is therefore by definition 
not a science park. Foreign experience show that science parks of this type have 
a much higher failure rate than incubators and 'real' science parks. 
The first science parks emerged in the United States during the 1950s. 
Europe foliowed in the 1970s, but science parks only started to grow rapidly in 
the past decade. Nowadays we find science parks - with different sizes and 
different degrees of specialization - in many countries: France, Great Britain, 
Germany, the United States, Canada, Sweden, Japan and The Netherlands. 
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eighties. Member states of the European Community, impressed by the success 
of the parks in the United States, started to create their own Silicon Valleys. 
Empirical evidence from the United States of substantial high technology growth 
in the vicinity of certain research institutes had made European politicians, 
facing serious economie problems and high unemployment rates in the tradi-
tional industrial areas, enthusiastic about the potential offered by science parks. 
While in Europe policy makers often focused on job creation, the Japanese 
government announced a project aimed at economie restructuring. This so-called 
Technopolis project was implemented to restructure the national economy from 
a traditional industrial manufacturing to knowledge intensive, high value-added 
production (cf. Stöhr and Ponighous 1992). The number of science parks in 
Japan (technopoles included) jumped from zero in 1980 to one hundred and 
three in 1990 (see Masuda 1990). In the United States, science parks 
boomed as well. Although they were originally a university initiative, state and 
local governments as well as real estate developers joined the science park 
carousel. Figures 3 and 4 show the rise of science parks in the United States and 
the European Community, respectively (time series are not available for Japan). 
Figure 3. Cumulative science park development in the United States 
76 T7 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
It was estimated by van Oirschot and Oosterman (1992) that direct employ-
ment offered by science parks is nowadays about 150,000 in the United States, 
50,000 in the European Community and 25,000 in Japan. Since reliable and 
comprehensive data about science parks are hard to find, these estimates are 
rather crude. Although science parks have been growing very fast in recent years, 
their impact on economie development should not be overestimated. They 
represent only a small fraction of jobs in the high-technology sectors and a 
negligible percentage of total employment in the major industrial countries. 
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Figure 4. Cumulative science park development in the European 
Community 
76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 
In spite of very different historical backgrounds, and of different social and 
economie conditions, it seems that three basic causes have led to the rapid 
growth of science parks in most industrialized countries: (a) a growing impact of 
technological development on economie growth, (b) the growing belief that 
universities and knowledge centres are underutilized sources of technological 
innovation, and (c) a change in regional policies (i.e., more bottom-up initia-
tives). 
Furthermore, in the 1980s universities and public research institutes in 
almost all industrial countries faced drastic budget cuts. It was feit that science 
parks could grow into an additional source of income for these institutions: a 
direct source, through the sale or lease of land, as well as an indirect source, 
because an improved image would allow a university to compete better for 
research funds and for bright students. In a number of countries, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, universities possessed land which they 
were only allowed to use for academie purposes. A side-effect of these budget 
cuts was an increased work-pressure on academies accompanied by an increased 
income differential between the private and public sector, which in turn would 
increase their willingness to become engaged in the commercialization of 
scientific research. 
In addition, universities and private companies show an increasing social 
responsibility. They are more and more inclined to pursue goals which are 
outside their original fields of interest, viz. education/research and profit, 
respectively. In some instances, the motivation of a founder to set up a science 
park is even to contribute to the local community. 
There is an increasing 'receptivity' of society towards technology, as well as 
an increasing awareness of the paramount impact of technological development 
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on economie welfare. This eases the path for governments, universities and 
private sector parties to promote science parks. 
In many regions all over the world, policy makers appear to have turned to 
the upgrading of indigenous regional resources, which may trigger new - often 
knowledge-based - activities (cf. Davelaar 1991, Rothwell and Zegveld 1985, 
M m 1990). The motives for indigenous development can be summarized as 
follows: (a) local firms are more firmly committed to local interests than branch 
plants; (b) new technology based firms, especially small ones, contribute 
considerably more than proportionally to the net growth of new jobs (see Birch 
1976); (e) new technology based firms are expected to offer higher salaries and 
higher quality jobs than relocated branch plants; (d) new technology based firms 
are considered to be 'footloose' (in contrast to the industries associated with the 
fourth Kondratieff wave, they need not be located near sources of raw materials, 
energy, water, etc), and (e) in providing employment stability in under-
industrialized regions, small local firms are superior to manufacturing divisions 
or branches of large firms. 
Government agencies in most industrialized countries have thus turned to 
the promotion of new and small high technology firms and the attraction of high 
technology investment as the new means of promoting regional development. In 
some of these countries, science parks have become an instrument of regional 
development. The majority of parks in Great Britain (see Henneberry 1984) and 
Japan (see Tatsuno 1986), for instance, has been created to relieve regional 
imbalances. In all cases, science parks appear to serve simultaneously a research 
function, a commercial function and a knowledge transfer function (see also 
Figure 5). 
Figure 5. The science park concept 
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4. The Operation of Science Parks 
The stages from planning a science park to its implementation as a 
sustainable success story of engineering creativity are manifold and long lasting. 
Here we will report on findings from a recent postal survey questionnaire among 
several science parks all over the world (see Van Oirschot and Oosterman 1992), 
with a special view on the following factors of decisive importance: 
strategie planning 
organization 
financing 
design and architecture 
management, and 
external environment 
All these factors will succinctly be dealt with. 
4.1 Strategie planning 
The strategie planning process which forms the first necessary step for a 
start-up phase of a science park is represented in Table 1. 
Table 1. The strategie planning process of a science park 
PHASE ACTIVITY PERIOD 
Goal setting Definition of product 
Before construc-
tion 
Strategy formulation Identification of product 
and market 
Strategy implementation Organization 
Financing 
Park design 
(Operational) Management 
During construc-
tion 
After construction 
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Given the multiplicity of actors involved, due attention has to be given to 
potential conflicts between objectives of various parties. Although every 
founding party seems to have its own individual goal, three distinct groups of 
founders each having similar types of goals can be distinguished: (1) government 
agencies (local, regional and central), (2) research institutes, and (3) private 
companies. 
Government agencies are involved in the vast majority of science parks, be it 
as founder, financier or otherwise. Their interest in science park development 
can be seen as a 'confluence' of structural changes in the world economy and of 
changes in regional policies. Government agencies mention various motives for 
their interest in science park development, such as job creation, economie 
growth, the restructuring of a region's economy, technology transfer, the creation 
or support of new technology based firms, the enhancement of research oppor-
tunities for universities, etc, but in the end these motives are derived from the 
wish to (1) stimulate technological development, or (2) to stimulate regional 
development. 
Universities (or in several, public research institutes) have been the very first 
organizations to create a science park. First generation parks, such as Stanford 
Research Park, Cambridge Science Park and the Research Park Triangle have 
all been initiated by universities, partly to use idle land or to invest capital. In 
other instances, universities or other higher educational institutions have not 
taken the initiative, but have been approached by government agencies or 
private companies to perform the research function of the park. The reasons for 
their involvement are many. 
The private sector has so far played a modest, though increasingly important, 
role in science park development. In general, it has foliowed a wait-and-see 
policy. The private firms which have already been involved in the establishment 
of a science park can be subdivided into three groups: (1) real estate developers 
operating purely for profit; (2) venture capitalists and high-technology firms 
aiming to have a 'window on technology' (this group appears to be small, 
probably because it is more efficiënt for them to invest in one of the companies 
located on the park than in the park itself); (3) large local firms investing in 
science parks for reasons of public relations and social responsibility (job 
creation, regional technological development). Table 2 lists the founders and 
their objectives. 
All parties involved share also a responsibility in terms of the science park 
product and the market by selecting the proper candidates. The large variety of 
related names (e.g., incubation centre, innovation centre, technology park, 
business park, brain park or research park) indicates that the actual practice 
shows a wide diversity of policy orientations of science parks. 
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Table 2. Goals and founders of science parks 
FOUNDER GOALS 
Government agencies Regional development 
Technological development 
Universities Regional development 
Technological development 
Financial returns 
Expand employment opportunities 
Enhance prestige 
Use idle land 
Invest capital 
Private firms Regional development 
Technological development 
Financial returns 
Window on technology 
Public relations 
It turns out that during the strategie planning stage the most important 
critical success factors from a managerial viewpoint are: 
harmonious working relationships among parties 
flexible and creative planning practices 
early establishment of formal links with a high quality research institute. 
4.2 Organization 
Science parks - once established - appear to exhibit a great variety of 
organizational configurations and cooperative modes. Table 3 gives a systematic 
typology of modes of cooperation by looking into both control and funding. 
This table gives in a pairwise way the most common and feasible modes of 
partnership among the main parties involved in the development of a science 
park. 
The extent to which a science park is a planned or is the result of a sponta-
neous development is of decisive importance for strategie planning, which in turn 
influences the organizational structure. The differences in strategie planning 
between European parks - where governments have a clear role in science park 
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Table 3. Partnerships of science park founders 
Control -+ 
Funding 4-
Government Research 
institute 
Private 
firm 
Property 
developer 
Government control by govern-
ment but universities 
have often creative 
leadership (formal 
co-operation) 
joint-venture; 
often a loose 
co-operation: 
more or less 
spontaneous 
development 
public private 
partnership; 
government 
funding lowers 
the risks 
public private 
partnership: 
government 
lowers risk 
and provides 
appropriate 
conditions 
Research 
Institute 
entirely owned 
& privately 
financed ven-
ture; sponta-
neous develo-
ped 
Firms firms doing 
part of the 
property deve-
lopment 
private firms 
provide a 
part of the 
property 
Property 
developer 
joint-venture 
on a formal 
base; both 
involved in 
decision ma-
king 
not present: 
science park 
too risky to be 
financed by 
private sector 
firms only 
not present: 
science park 
too risky to 
be financed 
by one pri-
vate firm 
establishment - and the United States - where governments have only marginally 
been involved in science park development - are usually reflected in the legal 
structure of the park. For example, in the United States approximately 25 per 
cent is owned by for-profit corporations (see Luger and Goldstein 1991). In 
Europe, on the other hand, more than 60 percent of the science parks is under 
governmental control, while the remainder is mainly controlled by universities. In 
Europe, public financing and other government assistance have played a more 
pronounced role in science park development. 
The various founding parties are able to create different types of partners-
hips. Since hardly any initiator, be it a research institute, government agency or 
private firm, has all managerial, technical and financial resources to develop a 
science park, it follows that critical success factors for the organization are: 
parties with complementary resources must cooperate; 
the organization structure must be chosen in accordance with the 
strategy of the founders. 
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4.3 Financing 
Science parks are primarily financed by public authorities and by univer-
sities. The private sector considers them as financially unattractive. From a 
societal point of view, science parks can nevertheless be very attractive. We will 
see that this inconsistency often justifies government interference. 
A science park can be seen as an investment decision with the following 
characteristics: 
Long gestation period: it typically takes 10 to 25 years before a science park 
breaks even or becomes profitable. This requires sufficiënt patience of all parties 
involved; it also requires financial instruments tuned to the expected cash flow 
pattem of the park and the ability of the investors to provide funds in subse-
quent stages of development. 
High capital investment amounts: especially in the first stage of development 
large amounts of money are required to finance land, site infrastructure and 
buildings of a fullsize science parks. 
Involvement of various parties: this multi-party model makes the financing 
decision more complex than a common business investment decision. 
Lack of liquidity: a financial participation in a park can only be sold after the 
science park turns out to be successful. In other words, exit options are virtually 
non-existent. This is of course an obstacle for private investors. 
The cash outlays of a science park are relatively high, concentrated at the 
beginning of the project and can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The 
cash revenues, however, are spread over the entire lifetime of the park and are 
difficult to estimate, because of the unique character of a science park (in terms 
of stated goals, location, and parties involved). The future cash revenues depend 
mainly on the number of tenants a science park is able to attract; it is difficult to 
assess this number. For these reasons, science parks are risky investment 
projects. The perception of the private sector is that the expected return of an 
equity participation in a science park cannot compensate for this risk. 
Private firms, including banks, are neither inclined to extend loans to science 
park founders. A park often lacks collateral; if a park fails, there will be hardly 
any assets that can be sold to pay off debts. This is because buildings and site 
infrastructure are adapted to the specific needs of tenant firms and are therefore 
difficult to sell in case of failure. 
The financing of science parks is therefore largely marked by the absence of 
private investors. In the United Kingdom, government agencies account for 
about 50 per cent of total financing of science parks; the figures for the United 
States and Japan are 50 and 94 per cent, respectively (see Masuda 1990, and 
Luger and Goldstein 1991). Figures about investments by research institutes are 
not available. Investments by the private sector are concentrated in a small 
number of parks which are located in areas which are already characterized by 
the presence of technology based firms. Both private parks in Japan and the 
seventeen fully privately financed parks in the US have all been set up in such 
areas; a similar situation exists in Europe, though in a less extreme form. In 
these cases the potential market for the product - space and services - is high, so 
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that revenues can be estimated with more accuracy and the gestation period is 
likely to be relatively shorter. In addition, the value of land in these 'high tech' 
areas is relatively high and can serve as collateral. 
Since few regions are endowed with a critical mass of new technology based 
firms, the vast majority of science parks is primarily financed with government 
money. Especially in the economically less developed regions science parks are 
heavily relying on public funding or semi-public funding (via state banks, e.g.). 
Clearly, a science park passes through different stages of its life time and the 
type of financing is dependent on its evolution. This is briefly summarized in 
Table 4, where a distinction is made between internal (i.e., directly committed 
via the management of a park) and external (only financially interested) 
investors. 
In retrospect, the most important critical success factors in the financing 
stages of a science park are: 
- substantial financial support of government authorities 
long-term commitment of all financiers 
willingness by financiers to absorb significant losses in the initial stages 
of a park development. 
Table 4. An overview of financiers in different stages of development of a 
science park 
Financiers Pre-
construction 
Land Construction Marketing Operation 
Internal investors 
Central governments X X X ? ? 
Local governments XX X XX ? ? 
Universities XX XX XX X X 
Private firms O o X ? ? 
Property developers ? 9 X 9 O 
Venture capitalists O o 9 9 o 
External investors 
Central governments ? 9 9 0 o 
Local governments XX XX XX ? 9 
Universities 9 9 o O o 
Private firms o o o o o 
Property developers o o X o o 
Venture capitalists o o o o o 
XX Financing important ? Financing possible 
X Financing available O Financing not available 
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4.4 Design and architecture 
The physical design and outer architecture of a science park is generally 
regarded as a major factor contributing to the image of a park. Landscaping is 
the process of making the site suitable for the science park to function. Many 
parks have formulated restrictions on land use are density. 
Virtually all successful science parks have restricted on site manufacturing. 
Most of them do not allow manufacturing at all, while others only allow light 
manufacturing or prototype production. Polluting and dangerous activities are 
almost always restricted or prohibited. Landscaping issues that effect a park's 
image are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5. Image related landscape issues 
Land available for development 
Volumetric ratio (floorspace / site area) 
Ecological / environmental issues 
Provision of residential areas and shopping centres 
Provision of leisure facilities 
Zoning restrictions 
In terms of critical success factors, the following conditions can be men-
tioned: 
a prestigious outlook and imaginative architecturing 
flexible and low cost buildings that are appropriate for innovative 
activities and knowledge transfer. 
4.5 Management 
The management of a science park is different from that of a conventional 
industrial park in that it undertakes efforts to stimulate cooperation between its 
tenants and to help its tenants grow. To encourage the transfer of technological 
knowledge between the commercial and research function and assist on site 
organizations, the management team provides for various services. 
Managing the park during the operational phase is considered to be a 
critical phase, as in this stage the park management has to prove that it is able 
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to sell its product and become a profitable organization. It is hard however to 
demonstrate a positive impact of the supply of non-property elements on the 
benefits of the commercial, research and knowledge transfer functions. Some 
even doubt whether on-site management is required to stimulate interactions 
between tenants and the university and whether assisting tenants will resolve 
particular business problems (Luger and Goldstein 1991). There are however 
some studies which suggest a positive contribution of services to the success of a 
science park. For example, in the United Kingdom, one third of companies 
located on a science park mentioned on-site management as a reason to locate 
on the site. Luger and Goldstein (1991) found that US parks consider the 
provision of services as one of the three most important location factors. 
Henneberry (1984) has divided the services that a management team can 
provide into four groups. The first group is basic unsophisticated services. These 
are the general secretarial services such as typing, reception, photocopying, 
telephone answering etc. Fax and electronic mail are also increasingly required 
by tenants and if provided centrally, they are cost-effective to tenants. Although 
science parks are set up to accommodate high tech firms, the tenant demand for 
these 'low tech' services is higher than the demand for more advanced services. 
The second group is technologe and training services. Contrary to basic 
services, technology support and training services are rarely provided on conven-
tional industrial estates. For this reason, new high tech firms regard these 
services as an 'added value' of the science park concept. Tenants have access to 
university libraries and databases and are sometimes advised on patents and 
other forms of intellectual property; research institutes might also be able to 
carry out subcontracted R&D. Technology support can be offered by an on-site 
company or research institute or by an external organization. 
In third group of services is business services, such as business planning, 
management consulting and marketing assistance. A particularly weak point of 
small firms is the formulation of a corporate business strategy and the implemen-
tation of this strategy. The management of a firm is often insufficiently aware of 
product/technology trends and the size of its target market, which can have 
considerable consequences for its future prospects. Marketing assistance is also 
important, as small firms are often unable to promote their products and to 
create the sales channels required to reach the national or international markets 
and thus fully exploit their products's profit potential. 
Financial services is the last group of services. They are of utmost importance 
to small firms. Many small firms or persons with promising ideas lack the cash to 
realize them. Banks and other private investors are reluctant to finance them for 
various reasons. 
As Table 6 shows, in most developed countries private funding and bank 
loans are the most important financing options for start-ups. Because of their 
modest financing requirements and high risk, venture capital is only available for 
the most promising small firms. A problem related to venture capital is the 
unwillingness of owners to lose control. A venture capital investment involves 
(quasi-) equity participation, which means that the firms are no longer fully 
owned by the founder(s). Furthermore, the concept of venture capital implies 
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active involvement in the companies they finance until they are sufficiently 
developed for disposition. This involvement varies from the presence of a 
member in the board of directors to hands-on management, to cope with 
problems such as marketing and financial matters. One can therefore say, that 
the equity gap experienced in this stage of development is mainly the result of a 
management gap. 
Government assistance (grants, loan guarantees, interest subsidies, etc.) is a 
small but growing source of finance for small firms. Unfortunately, small firms 
find it extremely difficult to obtain the support they are entitled to. The applica-
tion process is sometimes so complicated and time consuming that most firms do 
not even apply for government grants. 
The critical factors then for a successful management of science parks are: 
provision of services consistent with the science park's profile 
strict orientation of management strategies towards the park's needs 
attraction of some key firms ('anchor companies'). 
Table 6. Sources of finance for new SMEs (%) 
UK Japan US 
Personal savings 
Banks 
Government agencies 
Manufacturing companies 
55.0 
17.1 
16.9 
2.5 
60.2 
22.4 
2.3 
NA 
66.2 
25.0 
3.5 
NA 
Sources: Monck (1988) 
4.6 External environment 
Given the diversity and types of science parks, various important external 
factors can be distinguished that enhance the viability of a science park. They 
are summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7. External success factors of science parks 
Economie factors Social factors Environmental factors 
Risk capital 
Skilled labour force 
Related industries 
Infrastnicture 
Local support groups 
Entrepreneurial spirit 
Desirable living 
environment 
Most founders and managers of science parks are aware of the impact of 
these factors on the success of their park. If the region in which the park is 
located is not endowed with (all) external success factors, they sometimes 
attempt to 'internalize' these factors. Some parks, for instance, have created a 
venture capital fund to be invested in their own tenants, others organize courses 
in entrepreneurial management, or provide high quality telecommumcation 
facilities. 
The assumption that the availability of external success factors is positively 
correlated with per capita regional income is supported by Henneberry (1984) 
and Masuda (1990). They have shown that science parks (and especially the total 
acreage of parks) in the United Kingdom and Japan respectively are highly 
concentrated in regions with a per capita income above average. This is also 
confirmed by data from the US and the EC (see Table 8). 
Table 8. Science parks in regions with a per capita income above national 
average 
Number of parks 
(%) 
Total acreage of parks 
(%) 
Japan 
United States 
European Community 
United Kingdom 
66,0 
65,4 
49,7 
55,8 
86,7 
81,5 
68,4 
76,2 
Source: Henneberry (1984); Masuda (1990) 
Thus in conclusion economie, social and environmental factors may be seen 
as critica! external success factors for science parks. 
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4.7 Concluding remarks 
The above mentioned critical success factor have been identified from a 
broad survey among various science parks in various paris of the world. After 
this exploratory stage these results have been further investigated by in depth 
analysis of five specific science parks: Sophia Antipolis (France), the Stanford 
Research Park (USA), the Technopolis Project (Japan), the Hsinchu Science 
Based Industrial Park (Taiwan), and the Research Triangle Park (USA). The 
experiences from these cases supported the above exploratory notions. 
Science parks appear to differ enormously with respect to their strategie 
goals, their formulated strategy in terms of products and markets, and in the 
implementation of their strategies. At first sight, it seems impossible to formulate 
a list of critical success factors with general validity. But in practice, most science 
parks do pay attention to a number of common factors which are critical for 
their successful development. 
General speaking, science parks may act as the incubator of new 
technological development in a region, or they may be the result of such a 
development. In the first case, the region has already experienced the growth of 
technology based firms; then science parks, often set up by market-oriented 
universities or property developers, can take advantage of this situation by 
offering them space and services. Thus these parks have spontaneously devel-
oped. But the vast majority of science parks is set up in a region without the 
presence of a critical mass of technology based firms. Primarily because of the 
difficulty to demonstrate a market need for science parks in regions without a 
'high tech' industrial base, the private sector has been reluctant to invest in such 
developments. 
Thus, as a stand-alone project, a science park is usually not viable from a 
purely financial point of view: the expected return is not commensurate with the 
perceived risk. But the benefits of these 'forerunners of high-tech growth' must 
be seen in a broader context. From a long term perspective, science parks can 
contribute to the technological development of a region's or nation's economy. 
But since private investors do usually not obtain most of these benefits, many 
governments agencies and universities have financed the development of science 
parks, notably in Japan and Europe. Without this assistance it is unlikely that 
science park development would have existed at its current level. 
There are several factors which depend on the availability of fmancing: a 
prestigious outlook, the provision of services, and the provision of basic 
infrastructure. Science parks can create an attractive, prestigious image to attract 
large knowledge-intensive companies. Such companies are often able to generate 
a considerable and relatively riskless stream of income. A prestigious outlook 
can also be created to attract skilied labour force (e.g., the Hsinchu Science 
Based Industrial Park, Sophia Antipolis and various Japanese technopoles). This 
is important, because large firms are not willing to locate in an area with a 
shortage of skilled manpower. It must be noted however, that a prestigious 
outlook is expensive; if prices rise above a certain threshold, small technology 
based firms will no longer be able to pay the rent. In other words, a strong 
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emphasis on the prestige and overall image of the park may become at odds 
with its technology transfer function. 
The physical characteristics of a science park should of course meet evident 
conditions to attract tenant organizations, such as the presence of a good road 
infrastructure. 
To encourage the formation and growth of small high tech firms, science 
parks should also provide more advanced services. We stress the importance of 
basic services (such as shared fax or a centralized switchboard), technical and 
training services, business services and financial services. Financial assistance is 
especially important, since the problems of starting firms are primarily financial 
in nature. 
Contrary to most other organizations, science parks are usually set up by 
different institutions with different backgrounds and different strategie goals. The 
reason is that hardly any organization has all managerial, technical and financial 
resources at its disposal to develop a park. 
The goals of the different founders may conflict with one another. These 
conflicts must be resolved, before the science park can function as a coordinated 
entity. Since an organization cannot exist without agreement among the founders 
about its desired state, it is of utmost importance to build consensus in the 
strategie planning process. Needless to say that short-sighted, fragmented policy 
making among the government, business and university components of a science 
park will do harm to the achievements of a park. If research institutes and 
companies are to benefit from each other's strengths, a real 'think collaboration 
culture' has to be developed. 
The importance of harmonious working relationships is reinforced by the 
fact that founders have to cooperate for a long period of time. The typical 
gestation period for a park to become profitable or to break even is between 10 
to 25 years and exit options hardly exist. Especially the commitment of financiers 
in science park development is critical for its success. They must be able to 
absorb substantial losses during the gestation period. Financiers do not only need 
to finance the construction of the park, but also the park's management team. 
We have seen that government agencies are regularly involved in the financing 
of a park. 
The goals of an organization are best realized if strategy formulation and 
strategy implementation are congruent with these goals ('consistent fit'). The 
identification of product and target market, the organizational structure, the 
financing mechanisms, the physical characteristics of the park, as well as the 
services offered, are all to be determined by the goals set by the founders. 
Strategie planning practices must however, be flexible enough to respond easily 
to economie and technological changes. 
What, as a summary question, appear to be the critical success factors of a 
science parks? After a careful analysis of the theory and practice of science 
parks, they can all be traced back to: 
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• The availability of government financing (in particular, for science parks 
in regions without a critical mass of high-tech firms). 
• A consistent strategy, which leaves room for flexibility and creative 
management. 
• Harmonious, long term working relations, which are safeguarded by a 
nucleus of dedicated people. 
In conclusion, science parks can be seen as potentially powerful policy tools 
for regional development, but the road towards successful engineering creativity 
is paved with many stumbling blocks. Overcoming such bottlenecks in each 
development stage of the life cycle of a science park is a sine qua non. 
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